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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 or the MIT License.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR MIT
// Copyright Tock Contributors 2022.
//! Implements and virtualizes AES-CCM* encryption/decryption/authentication using an underlying
//! AES-CBC and AES-CTR implementation.
//!
//! IEEE 802.15.4-2015: Appendix B.4.1, CCM* transformations. CCM* is
//! defined so that both encryption and decryption can be done by preparing two
//! fields: the AuthData and either the PlaintextData or the CiphertextData.
//! Then, two passes of AES are performed with one block of overlap.
//!
//! ```text
//! crypt_buf: [ -------- AuthData -------- | -------- PData/CData -------- ]
//! aes_cbc: \__________________________/
//! aes_ctr: \ 1 blk | _____________________________/
//! ```
//!
//! The overlapping block is then the encrypted authentication tag U. For
//! encryption, we append U to the data as a message integrity code (MIC).
//! For decryption, we compare U with the provided MIC.
//
//! This is true only if data confidentiality is not needed. If it is, then
//! the AuthData includes the PlaintextData. At encryption, we perform CBC over
//! both fields, then copy the last block to just before the PData. Then,
//! CTR mode is performed over the same overlapping region, forming the encrypted
//! authentication tag U.
//!
//! ```text
//! crypt_buf: [ -------- AuthData -------- | -------- PData/CData -------- ]
//! aes_cbc: \__________________________________________________________/
//! aes_ctr: \ 1 blk | _____________________________/
//! ```
//!
//! At decryption, there is no choice but the reverse the order of operations.
//! First, we zero out the overlapping block and perform ctr over it and the
//! PlaintextData. This produces Enc(Key, A_i), which we save in saved_tag.
//! Then, we restore the previous value of the last block of AuthData and re-pad
//! PlaintextData before running CBC over both fields. The last step is to
//! combine saved_tag and the unencrypted tag to form the encrypted tag and
//! verify its correctness.
//!
//! Usage
//! -----
//!
//! ```rust,ignore
//! # use capsules_core::test::aes_ccm::Test;
//! # use capsules_core::virtual_aes_ccm;
//! # use kernel::common::deferred_call::DeferredCallClient;
//! # use kernel::hil::symmetric_encryption::{AES128, AES128CCM, AES128_BLOCK_SIZE};
//! # use kernel::static_init;
//! # use sam4l::aes::{Aes, AES};
//! type AESCCMMUX = virtual_aes_ccm::MuxAES128CCM<'static, Aes<'static>>;
//! type AESCCMCLIENT = virtual_aes_ccm::VirtualAES128CCM<'static, AESCCMMUX>;
//! // mux
//! let ccm_mux = static_init!(AESCCMMUX, virtual_aes_ccm::MuxAES128CCM::new(&AES));
//! ccm_mux.register();
//! AES.set_client(ccm_mux);
//! const CRYPT_SIZE: usize = 7 * AES128_BLOCK_SIZE;
//! let crypt_buf1 = static_init!([u8; CRYPT_SIZE], [0x00; CRYPT_SIZE]);
//! let ccm_client1 = static_init!(
//! AESCCMCLIENT,
//! virtual_aes_ccm::VirtualAES128CCM::new(ccm_mux, crypt_buf1)
//! );
//! ccm_client1.setup();
//! let data1 = static_init!([u8; 4 * AES128_BLOCK_SIZE], [0x00; 4 * AES128_BLOCK_SIZE]);
//! let t1 = static_init!(Test<'static, AESCCMCLIENT>, Test::new(ccm_client1, data1));
//! ccm_client1.set_client(t1);
//! let crypt_buf2 = static_init!([u8; CRYPT_SIZE], [0x00; CRYPT_SIZE]);
//! let ccm_client2 = static_init!(
//! AESCCMCLIENT,
//! virtual_aes_ccm::VirtualAES128CCM::new(ccm_mux, crypt_buf2)
//! );
//! ccm_client2.setup();
//! let data2 = static_init!([u8; 4 * AES128_BLOCK_SIZE], [0x00; 4 * AES128_BLOCK_SIZE]);
//! let t2 = static_init!(Test<'static, AESCCMCLIENT>, Test::new(ccm_client2, data2));
//! ccm_client2.set_client(t2);
//! t1.run();
//! t2.run();
//!
//! ```
use core::cell::Cell;
use kernel::collections::list::{List, ListLink, ListNode};
use kernel::debug;
use kernel::deferred_call::{DeferredCall, DeferredCallClient};
use kernel::hil::symmetric_encryption;
use kernel::hil::symmetric_encryption::{
AES128Ctr, AES128, AES128CBC, AES128ECB, AES128_BLOCK_SIZE, AES128_KEY_SIZE, CCM_NONCE_LENGTH,
};
use kernel::utilities::cells::{OptionalCell, TakeCell};
use kernel::ErrorCode;
use crate::stream::SResult;
use crate::stream::{encode_bytes, encode_u16};
#[derive(Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq, Debug)]
enum CCMState {
Idle,
Auth,
Encrypt,
}
// to cache up the function parameters of the crypt() function
struct CryptFunctionParameters {
buf: &'static mut [u8],
a_off: usize,
m_off: usize,
m_len: usize,
mic_len: usize,
confidential: bool,
encrypting: bool,
}
impl CryptFunctionParameters {
pub fn new(
buf: &'static mut [u8],
a_off: usize,
m_off: usize,
m_len: usize,
mic_len: usize,
confidential: bool,
encrypting: bool,
) -> CryptFunctionParameters {
CryptFunctionParameters {
buf,
a_off,
m_off,
m_len,
mic_len,
confidential,
encrypting,
}
}
}
pub struct MuxAES128CCM<'a, A: AES128<'a> + AES128Ctr + AES128CBC + AES128ECB> {
aes: &'a A,
client: OptionalCell<&'a dyn symmetric_encryption::Client<'a>>,
ccm_clients: List<'a, VirtualAES128CCM<'a, A>>,
inflight: OptionalCell<&'a VirtualAES128CCM<'a, A>>,
deferred_call: DeferredCall,
}
impl<'a, A: AES128<'a> + AES128Ctr + AES128CBC + AES128ECB> MuxAES128CCM<'a, A> {
pub fn new(aes: &'a A) -> Self {
aes.enable(); // enable the hardware, in case it's forgotten elsewhere
Self {
aes,
client: OptionalCell::empty(),
ccm_clients: List::new(),
inflight: OptionalCell::empty(),
deferred_call: DeferredCall::new(),
}
}
/// Asynchronously executes the next operation, if any. Used by calls
/// to trigger do_next_op such that it will execute after the call
/// returns.
/// See virtual_uart::MuxUart<'a>::do_next_op_async
fn do_next_op_async(&self) {
self.deferred_call.set();
}
fn do_next_op(&self) {
if self.inflight.is_none() {
let mnode = self
.ccm_clients
.iter()
.find(|node| node.queued_up.is_some());
mnode.map(|node| {
self.inflight.set(node);
let parameters: CryptFunctionParameters = node.queued_up.take().unwrap();
// now, eat the parameters
let _ = node.crypt_r(parameters).map_err(|(ecode, _)| {
// notice that we didn't put the parameters back...
// because it's already eaten
if node.ccm_client.is_none() {
debug!("virtual_aes_ccm: no ccm_client is registered in VirtualAES128CCM");
}
if node.buf.is_none() {
debug!("virtual_aes_ccm: no buffer is binded with VirtualAES128CCM");
}
// notify the client that there's a failure
node.buf.take().map(|buf| {
node.ccm_client.map(move |client| {
client.crypt_done(buf, Err(ecode), false);
});
});
// if it fails to trigger encryption, remove it and perform the next
node.remove_from_queue();
self.do_next_op();
});
// otherwise, wait for crypt_done
});
}
}
}
impl<'a, A: AES128<'a> + AES128Ctr + AES128CBC + AES128ECB> DeferredCallClient
for MuxAES128CCM<'a, A>
{
fn handle_deferred_call(&self) {
self.do_next_op();
}
fn register(&'static self) {
self.deferred_call.register(self);
}
}
impl<'a, A: AES128<'a> + AES128Ctr + AES128CBC + AES128ECB> symmetric_encryption::Client<'a>
for MuxAES128CCM<'a, A>
{
fn crypt_done(&'a self, source: Option<&'static mut [u8]>, dest: &'static mut [u8]) {
if self.inflight.is_none() {
self.client.map(move |client| {
client.crypt_done(source, dest);
});
return;
}
self.inflight.map(move |vaes_ccm| {
// vaes_ccm.crypt_done might call additional start_ccm_crypt / start_ccm_auth
// when the encryption is *really* done, inflight will be cleared by remove_from_queue
// and it will call do_next_op to perform the next operation
// self.do_next_op() will be called when the encryption is failed or is really done
// search for self.ccm_client
vaes_ccm.crypt_done(source, dest);
});
}
}
pub struct VirtualAES128CCM<'a, A: AES128<'a> + AES128Ctr + AES128CBC + AES128ECB> {
mux: &'a MuxAES128CCM<'a, A>,
aes: &'a A,
next: ListLink<'a, VirtualAES128CCM<'a, A>>,
crypt_buf: TakeCell<'static, [u8]>,
crypt_auth_len: Cell<usize>,
crypt_enc_len: Cell<usize>,
ccm_client: OptionalCell<&'a dyn symmetric_encryption::CCMClient>,
state: Cell<CCMState>,
confidential: Cell<bool>,
encrypting: Cell<bool>,
buf: TakeCell<'static, [u8]>,
pos: Cell<(usize, usize, usize, usize)>,
key: Cell<[u8; AES128_KEY_SIZE]>,
nonce: Cell<[u8; CCM_NONCE_LENGTH]>,
saved_tag: Cell<[u8; AES128_BLOCK_SIZE]>,
queued_up: OptionalCell<CryptFunctionParameters>,
}
impl<'a, A: AES128<'a> + AES128Ctr + AES128CBC + AES128ECB> VirtualAES128CCM<'a, A> {
pub fn new(
mux: &'a MuxAES128CCM<'a, A>,
crypt_buf: &'static mut [u8],
) -> VirtualAES128CCM<'a, A> {
VirtualAES128CCM {
mux,
aes: mux.aes,
next: ListLink::empty(),
crypt_buf: TakeCell::new(crypt_buf),
crypt_auth_len: Cell::new(0),
crypt_enc_len: Cell::new(0),
ccm_client: OptionalCell::empty(),
state: Cell::new(CCMState::Idle),
confidential: Cell::new(false),
encrypting: Cell::new(false),
buf: TakeCell::empty(),
pos: Cell::new((0, 0, 0, 0)),
key: Cell::new(Default::default()),
nonce: Cell::new(Default::default()),
saved_tag: Cell::new(Default::default()),
queued_up: OptionalCell::empty(),
}
}
/// bind itself to self.mux, should be called after static_init!
pub fn setup(&'a self) {
self.mux.ccm_clients.push_head(self);
}
/// Prepares crypt_buf with the input for the CCM* authentication and
/// encryption/decryption transformations. Returns NOMEM if crypt_buf is
/// not present or if it is not long enough.
fn prepare_ccm_buffer(
&self,
nonce: &[u8; CCM_NONCE_LENGTH],
mic_len: usize,
a_data: &[u8],
m_data: &[u8],
) -> Result<(), ErrorCode> {
self.crypt_buf.map_or(Err(ErrorCode::NOMEM), |cbuf| {
let (auth_len, enc_len) =
match Self::encode_ccm_buffer(cbuf, nonce, mic_len, a_data, m_data) {
SResult::Done(_, out) => out,
SResult::Needed(_) => {
return Err(ErrorCode::NOMEM);
}
SResult::Error(()) => {
return Err(ErrorCode::FAIL);
}
};
// debug!("auth: ({})", auth_len);
// for i in 0..auth_len {
// debug!("{:02x}", cbuf[i]);
// }
// debug!("enc: ({})", enc_len);
// for i in auth_len..enc_len {
// debug!("{:02x}", cbuf[i]);
// }
self.crypt_auth_len.set(auth_len);
self.crypt_enc_len.set(enc_len);
Ok(())
})
}
/// This function encodes AuthData (a_data) and PData/CData (m_data) into a
/// buffer, along with the prerequisite metadata/padding bytes. On success,
/// `auth_len` (the length of the AuthData field) and `enc_len` (the
/// combined length of AuthData and PData/CData) are returned. `auth_len` is
/// guaranteed to be >= AES128_BLOCK_SIZE
fn encode_ccm_buffer(
buf: &mut [u8],
nonce: &[u8; CCM_NONCE_LENGTH],
mic_len: usize,
a_data: &[u8],
m_data: &[u8],
) -> SResult<(usize, usize)> {
// IEEE 802.15.4-2015: Appendix B.4.1.2, CCM* authentication
// The authentication tag T is computed with AES128-CBC-MAC on
// B_0 | AuthData, where
// B_0 = Flags (1 byte) | nonce (13 bytes) | m length (2 bytes)
// Flags = 0 | A data present? (1 bit) | M (3 bits) | L (3 bits)
// AuthData = AddAuthData | PlaintextData
// AddAuthData = L(a) (encoding of a_data.len()) | a_data
// PlaintextData = m_data
// Both AddAuthData and PlaintextData are 0-padded to 16-byte blocks.
// The following code places B_0 | AuthData into crypt_buf.
// flags = reserved | Adata | (M - 2) / 2 | (L - 1)
let mut flags: u8 = 0;
if a_data.len() != 0 {
flags |= 1 << 6;
}
if mic_len != 0 {
flags |= (((mic_len - 2) / 2) as u8) << 3;
}
flags |= 1;
stream_len_cond!(buf, AES128_BLOCK_SIZE);
// The first block is flags | nonce | m length
buf[0] = flags;
buf[1..14].copy_from_slice(nonce.as_ref());
let mut off = enc_consume!(buf, 14; encode_u16,
(m_data.len() as u16).to_le());
// After that comes L(a) | a, where L(a) is the following
// encoding of a_len:
if a_data.len() == 0 {
// L(a) is empty, and the Adata flag is zero
} else if a_data.len() < 0xff00_usize {
// L(a) is l(a) in 2 bytes of little-endian
off = enc_consume!(buf, off; encode_u16,
(a_data.len() as u16).to_le());
} else {
// These length encoding branches are defined in the specification
// but should never be reached because our MTU is 127.
stream_err!(());
}
// Append the auth data and 0-pad to a multiple of 16 bytes
off = enc_consume!(buf, off; encode_bytes, a_data);
let auth_len = ((off + AES128_BLOCK_SIZE - 1) / AES128_BLOCK_SIZE) * AES128_BLOCK_SIZE;
stream_len_cond!(buf, auth_len);
buf[off..auth_len].iter_mut().for_each(|b| *b = 0);
off = auth_len;
// Append plaintext data and 0-pad to a multiple of 16 bytes
off = enc_consume!(buf, off; encode_bytes, m_data);
let enc_len = ((off + AES128_BLOCK_SIZE - 1) / AES128_BLOCK_SIZE) * AES128_BLOCK_SIZE;
stream_len_cond!(buf, enc_len);
buf[off..enc_len].iter_mut().for_each(|b| *b = 0);
off = enc_len;
stream_done!(off, (auth_len, enc_len));
}
fn reversed(&self) -> bool {
self.confidential.get() && !self.encrypting.get()
}
// Assumes that the state is Idle, which means that crypt_buf must be
// present. Panics if this is not the case.
fn start_ccm_auth(&self) -> Result<(), ErrorCode> {
if !(self.state.get() == CCMState::Idle)
&& !(self.state.get() == CCMState::Encrypt && self.reversed())
{
panic!("Called start_ccm_auth when not idle");
}
// We are performing CBC-MAC, so always encrypting.
self.aes.set_mode_aes128cbc(true)?;
let iv = [0u8; AES128_BLOCK_SIZE];
let res = self.aes.set_iv(&iv);
if res != Ok(()) {
return res;
}
let res = self.aes.set_key(&self.key.get());
if res != Ok(()) {
return res;
}
let crypt_buf = match self.crypt_buf.take() {
None => panic!("Cannot perform CCM* auth because crypt_buf is not present."),
Some(buf) => buf,
};
// If confidentiality is needed, authenticate over message data.
let auth_end = if self.confidential.get() {
self.crypt_enc_len.get()
} else {
self.crypt_auth_len.get()
};
self.aes.start_message();
match self.aes.crypt(None, crypt_buf, 0, auth_end) {
None => {
self.state.set(CCMState::Auth);
Ok(())
}
Some((res, _, crypt_buf)) => {
// Request failed
self.crypt_buf.replace(crypt_buf);
res
}
}
}
fn start_ccm_encrypt(&self) -> Result<(), ErrorCode> {
if !(self.state.get() == CCMState::Auth)
&& !(self.state.get() == CCMState::Idle && self.reversed())
{
return Err(ErrorCode::FAIL);
}
self.state.set(CCMState::Idle); // default to fail
// debug!("after auth:");
// self.crypt_buf.map(|buf| {
// for i in 0..self.crypt_auth_len.get() {
// debug!("{:02x}", buf[i]);
// }
// });
self.aes.set_mode_aes128ctr(self.encrypting.get())?;
let res = self.aes.set_key(&self.key.get());
if res != Ok(()) {
return res;
}
let mut iv = [0u8; AES128_BLOCK_SIZE];
// flags = reserved | reserved | 0 | (L - 1)
// Since L = 2, flags = 1.
iv[0] = 1;
iv[1..1 + CCM_NONCE_LENGTH].copy_from_slice(&self.nonce.get());
let res = self.aes.set_iv(&iv);
if res != Ok(()) {
return res;
}
self.aes.start_message();
let crypt_buf = match self.crypt_buf.take() {
None => panic!("Cannot perform CCM* encrypt because crypt_buf is not present."),
Some(buf) => buf,
};
match self.aes.crypt(
None,
crypt_buf,
self.crypt_auth_len.get() - AES128_BLOCK_SIZE,
self.crypt_enc_len.get(),
) {
None => {
self.state.set(CCMState::Encrypt);
Ok(())
}
Some((res, _, crypt_buf)) => {
self.crypt_buf.replace(crypt_buf);
res
}
}
}
fn end_ccm(&self) {
let tag_valid = self.buf.map_or(false, |buf| {
self.crypt_buf.map_or_else(
|| {
panic!("We lost track of crypt_buf!");
},
|cbuf| {
// Copy the encrypted/decrypted message data
let (_, m_off, m_len, mic_len) = self.pos.get();
let auth_len = self.crypt_auth_len.get();
buf[m_off..m_off + m_len].copy_from_slice(&cbuf[auth_len..auth_len + m_len]);
let m_end = m_off + m_len;
let tag_off = auth_len - AES128_BLOCK_SIZE;
if self.encrypting.get() {
// Copy the encrypted tag to the end of the message
buf[m_end..m_end + mic_len]
.copy_from_slice(&cbuf[tag_off..tag_off + mic_len]);
true
} else {
// Compare the computed encrypted tag to the received
// encrypted tag
buf[m_end..m_end + mic_len]
.iter()
.zip(cbuf[tag_off..tag_off + mic_len].iter())
.all(|(a, b)| *a == *b)
}
},
)
});
// encryption is successful
self.state.set(CCMState::Idle);
self.remove_from_queue();
self.mux.do_next_op();
self.ccm_client.map(|client| {
self.buf.take().map(|buf| {
client.crypt_done(buf, Ok(()), tag_valid);
});
});
}
fn reverse_end_ccm(&self) {
// Finalize CCM process only in the case where we did CTR before CBC
let tag_valid = self.buf.map_or(false, |buf| {
self.crypt_buf.map_or_else(
|| {
panic!("We lost track of crypt_buf!");
},
|cbuf| {
let (_, m_off, m_len, mic_len) = self.pos.get();
// Combine unencrypted tag at end of crypt_buf with saved
// CTR-encrypted block to obtain encrypted tag
let tag_off = self.crypt_enc_len.get() - AES128_BLOCK_SIZE;
self.saved_tag.get()[..mic_len]
.iter()
.zip(cbuf[tag_off..tag_off + mic_len].iter_mut())
.for_each(|(a, b)| *b ^= *a);
// Compare the computed encrypted tag to the received
// encrypted tag
buf[m_off + m_len..m_off + m_len + mic_len]
.iter()
.zip(cbuf[tag_off..tag_off + mic_len].iter())
.all(|(a, b)| *a == *b)
},
)
});
// encryption is successful
self.state.set(CCMState::Idle);
self.remove_from_queue();
self.mux.do_next_op();
self.ccm_client.map(|client| {
self.buf.take().map(|buf| {
client.crypt_done(buf, Ok(()), tag_valid);
});
});
}
fn save_tag_block(&self) {
// Copies [auth_len - AES128_BLOCK_SIZE..auth_len] to saved_tag
// and zeroes it out
let auth_len = self.crypt_auth_len.get();
self.crypt_buf.map(|cbuf| {
let mut cbuf_block = [0u8; AES128_BLOCK_SIZE];
cbuf_block.copy_from_slice(&cbuf[auth_len - AES128_BLOCK_SIZE..auth_len]);
self.saved_tag.set(cbuf_block);
cbuf[auth_len - AES128_BLOCK_SIZE..auth_len]
.iter_mut()
.for_each(|b| *b = 0);
});
}
fn swap_tag_block(&self) {
// Swaps [auth_len - AES128_BLOCK_SIZE..auth_len] with
// the value in saved_tag
let auth_len = self.crypt_auth_len.get();
self.crypt_buf.map(|cbuf| {
let mut cbuf_block = [0u8; AES128_BLOCK_SIZE];
cbuf_block.copy_from_slice(&cbuf[auth_len - AES128_BLOCK_SIZE..auth_len]);
cbuf[auth_len - AES128_BLOCK_SIZE..auth_len].copy_from_slice(&self.saved_tag.get());
self.saved_tag.set(cbuf_block);
});
}
fn crypt_r(
&self,
parameter: CryptFunctionParameters,
) -> Result<(), (ErrorCode, &'static mut [u8])> {
// just expanding the parameters......
let buf: &'static mut [u8] = parameter.buf;
let a_off: usize = parameter.a_off;
let m_off: usize = parameter.m_off;
let m_len: usize = parameter.m_len;
let mic_len: usize = parameter.mic_len;
let confidential: bool = parameter.confidential;
let encrypting: bool = parameter.encrypting;
//
if self.state.get() != CCMState::Idle {
return Err((ErrorCode::BUSY, buf));
}
if !(a_off <= m_off && m_off + m_len + mic_len <= buf.len()) {
return Err((ErrorCode::INVAL, buf));
}
self.confidential.set(confidential);
self.encrypting.set(encrypting);
let res = self.prepare_ccm_buffer(
&self.nonce.get(),
mic_len,
&buf[a_off..m_off],
&buf[m_off..m_off + m_len],
);
if res != Ok(()) {
return Err((res.unwrap_err(), buf));
}
let res = if !confidential || encrypting {
// Perform CBC before CTR
self.start_ccm_auth()
} else {
// Perform CTR before CBC
self.save_tag_block();
self.start_ccm_encrypt()
};
if res != Ok(()) {
Err((res.unwrap_err(), buf))
} else {
self.buf.replace(buf);
self.pos.set((a_off, m_off, m_len, mic_len));
Ok(())
}
}
fn remove_from_queue(&self) {
self.queued_up.clear();
self.mux.inflight.clear();
}
}
impl<'a, A: AES128<'a> + AES128Ctr + AES128CBC + AES128ECB> symmetric_encryption::AES128CCM<'a>
for VirtualAES128CCM<'a, A>
{
fn set_client(&self, client: &'a dyn symmetric_encryption::CCMClient) {
self.ccm_client.set(client);
}
fn set_key(&self, key: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ErrorCode> {
if key.len() < AES128_KEY_SIZE {
Err(ErrorCode::INVAL)
} else {
let mut new_key = [0u8; AES128_KEY_SIZE];
new_key.copy_from_slice(key);
self.key.set(new_key);
Ok(())
}
}
fn set_nonce(&self, nonce: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ErrorCode> {
if nonce.len() < CCM_NONCE_LENGTH {
Err(ErrorCode::INVAL)
} else {
let mut new_nonce = [0u8; CCM_NONCE_LENGTH];
new_nonce.copy_from_slice(nonce);
self.nonce.set(new_nonce);
Ok(())
}
}
/// Try to begin the encryption/decryption process
fn crypt(
&self,
buf: &'static mut [u8],
a_off: usize,
m_off: usize,
m_len: usize,
mic_len: usize,
confidential: bool,
encrypting: bool,
) -> Result<(), (ErrorCode, &'static mut [u8])> {
if self.queued_up.is_some() {
return Err((ErrorCode::BUSY, buf));
}
if self.state.get() != CCMState::Idle {
return Err((ErrorCode::BUSY, buf));
}
if !(a_off <= m_off && m_off + m_len + mic_len <= buf.len()) {
return Err((ErrorCode::INVAL, buf));
}
self.queued_up.set(CryptFunctionParameters::new(
buf,
a_off,
m_off,
m_len,
mic_len,
confidential,
encrypting,
));
self.mux.do_next_op_async();
Ok(())
}
}
impl<'a, A: AES128<'a> + AES128Ctr + AES128CBC + AES128ECB> symmetric_encryption::AES128<'a>
for VirtualAES128CCM<'a, A>
{
fn enable(&self) {
self.aes.enable();
}
fn disable(&self) {
self.aes.disable();
}
fn set_client(&'a self, client: &'a dyn symmetric_encryption::Client<'a>) {
self.mux.client.set(client);
}
fn set_key(&self, key: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ErrorCode> {
if self.mux.inflight.is_none() {
self.mux.aes.set_key(key)
} else {
Err(ErrorCode::BUSY)
}
}
fn set_iv(&self, iv: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ErrorCode> {
if self.mux.inflight.is_none() {
self.mux.aes.set_iv(iv)
} else {
Err(ErrorCode::BUSY)
}
}
fn start_message(&self) {
if self.mux.inflight.is_none() {
self.mux.aes.start_message()
}
}
fn crypt(
&self,
source: Option<&'static mut [u8]>,
dest: &'static mut [u8],
start_index: usize,
stop_index: usize,
) -> Option<(
Result<(), ErrorCode>,
Option<&'static mut [u8]>,
&'static mut [u8],
)> {
if self.mux.inflight.is_none() {
self.mux.aes.crypt(source, dest, start_index, stop_index)
} else {
Some((Err(ErrorCode::BUSY), source, dest))
}
}
}
impl<'a, A: AES128<'a> + AES128Ctr + AES128CBC + AES128ECB> AES128Ctr for VirtualAES128CCM<'a, A> {
fn set_mode_aes128ctr(&self, encrypting: bool) -> Result<(), ErrorCode> {
if self.mux.inflight.is_none() {
self.mux.aes.set_mode_aes128ctr(encrypting)
} else {
Err(ErrorCode::BUSY)
}
}
}
impl<'a, A: AES128<'a> + AES128Ctr + AES128CBC + AES128ECB> AES128ECB for VirtualAES128CCM<'a, A> {
fn set_mode_aes128ecb(&self, encrypting: bool) -> Result<(), ErrorCode> {
if self.mux.inflight.is_none() {
self.mux.aes.set_mode_aes128ecb(encrypting)
} else {
Err(ErrorCode::BUSY)
}
}
}
impl<'a, A: AES128<'a> + AES128Ctr + AES128CBC + AES128ECB> AES128CBC for VirtualAES128CCM<'a, A> {
fn set_mode_aes128cbc(&self, encrypting: bool) -> Result<(), ErrorCode> {
if self.mux.inflight.is_none() {
self.mux.aes.set_mode_aes128cbc(encrypting)
} else {
Err(ErrorCode::BUSY)
}
}
}
impl<'a, A: AES128<'a> + AES128Ctr + AES128CBC + AES128ECB> symmetric_encryption::Client<'a>
for VirtualAES128CCM<'a, A>
{
fn crypt_done(&self, _: Option<&'static mut [u8]>, crypt_buf: &'static mut [u8]) {
self.crypt_buf.replace(crypt_buf);
match self.state.get() {
CCMState::Idle => {}
CCMState::Auth => {
if !self.reversed() {
if self.confidential.get() {
let (_, m_off, m_len, _) = self.pos.get();
let auth_len = self.crypt_auth_len.get();
let enc_len = self.crypt_enc_len.get();
self.crypt_buf.map(|cbuf| {
// If we authenticated over the plaintext, copy the last
// block over to the beginning again so that it becomes
// the encrypted tag after ctr mode
let auth_last = auth_len - AES128_BLOCK_SIZE;
let enc_last = enc_len - AES128_BLOCK_SIZE;
for i in 0..AES128_BLOCK_SIZE {
cbuf[auth_last + i] = cbuf[enc_last + i];
}
// Then repopulate the plaintext data field
self.buf.map(|buf| {
cbuf[auth_len..auth_len + m_len]
.copy_from_slice(&buf[m_off..m_off + m_len]);
});
cbuf[auth_len + m_len..enc_len]
.iter_mut()
.for_each(|b| *b = 0);
});
}
let res = self.start_ccm_encrypt();
if res != Ok(()) {
// The operation fails, immediately remove the request and perform the next operation
self.state.set(CCMState::Idle);
self.remove_from_queue();
self.mux.do_next_op();
// Return client buffer to client
self.buf.take().map(|buf| {
self.ccm_client.map(move |client| {
client.crypt_done(buf, res, false);
});
});
}
} else {
self.reverse_end_ccm();
}
}
CCMState::Encrypt => {
if !self.reversed() {
self.end_ccm();
} else {
self.swap_tag_block();
self.crypt_buf.map(|cbuf| {
// Copy the encrypted/decrypted message data
let (_, m_off, m_len, _) = self.pos.get();
let auth_len = self.crypt_auth_len.get();
self.buf.map(|buf| {
buf[m_off..m_off + m_len]
.copy_from_slice(&cbuf[auth_len..auth_len + m_len]);
});
// Reset the rest of the padding
cbuf[self.crypt_auth_len.get() + m_len..self.crypt_enc_len.get()]
.iter_mut()
.for_each(|b| *b = 0);
});
let res = self.start_ccm_auth();
if res != Ok(()) {
// Return client buffer to ccm_clients
self.buf.take().map(|buf| {
self.ccm_client.map(move |client| {
client.crypt_done(buf, res, false);
});
});
// The operation fails, immediately remove the request and perform the next operation
self.state.set(CCMState::Idle);
self.remove_from_queue();
self.mux.do_next_op();
}
}
}
}
}
}
// Fit in the linked list
impl<'a, A: AES128<'a> + AES128Ctr + AES128CBC + AES128ECB> ListNode<'a, VirtualAES128CCM<'a, A>>
for VirtualAES128CCM<'a, A>
{
fn next(&'a self) -> &'a ListLink<'a, VirtualAES128CCM<'a, A>> {
&self.next
}
}